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This paper constitutes an initial attempt to shed light on the role of income distribution for household 
debt in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe (CESEE). Using household- level data from the 
OeNB’s Euro Survey for the period 2008– 2018, we address the question whether interpersonal com-
parisons (“Keeping up with the Novaks”) are associated with the probability of having a loan and 
planning to take out a loan. Applying multilevel probit modeling to consider the hierarchical structure 
of the data, our results support the notion that higher income inequality is negatively correlated with 
the probability of having a loan at the bottom of the distribution, and positively at the top. We show 
this impact for almost all components of household debt, but evidence is strongest for mortgage and 
foreign currency loans. Loan plans are associated with income inequality at the very top of the income 
distribution.
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1. introduction
The global financial crisis that started in 2008 has increasingly drawn atten-
tion to the importance of, and the threats arising from, household sector debt for 
macroeconomic stability and GDP growth. Therefore, policymakers and research-
ers alike have turned their attention to the factors driving household indebted-
ness. Our analysis constitutes a comprehensive endeavor to relate debt and income 
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distribution for households in the countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern 
Europe (CESEE) for the period 2008– 2018.
What is the relation between household debt and income inequality? Two 
hypotheses have been forwarded in the theoretical literature. First, positional 
income concerns have been recognized as a factor influencing consumption since 
Veblen (1899) and Duesenberry (1949), a phenomenon referred to as “Keeping 
up with the Joneses.” As debt can be used to finance consumption, higher income 
inequality could lead to an increase in consumption- related debt for households 
who see their reference households’ income increase. Therefore, we investigate if  
a “Keeping up with the Novaks” effect - as we fittingly rename the “Keeping up 
with the Joneses” effect - can be observed in CESEE. Second, income inequality 
could be a “signaling” factor indicating the creditworthiness of borrowers to lend-
ers (i.e., banks). Accordingly, ceteris paribus, with a more unequal income distri-
bution, lenders would become more risk- averse and tend to lend to more affluent 
households rather than households on the lower end of the distribution (Coibion 
et al., 2014).
A limited number of papers have addressed the empirical link between 
household debt and income distribution, focusing primarily on advanced econo-
mies (e.g., Iacoviello, 2008; Coibion et al., 2014; Kumhof et al., 2015 for the US, 
Loschiavo, 2016 for Italy, Brown et al., 2016 for the United Kingdom). Two very 
recent papers are closely related to ours. Jestl (2019) suggests a positive impact of 
income inequality on consumption- related household indebtedness in a sample of 
EU countries, but not for the CESEE countries as included in our paper. In addi-
tion, Hake and Poyntner (2019) constitutes an initial analysis of the correlation 
between the probability of being indebted and income inequality according to the 
income position.
Notably, the analysis of the household indebtedness- income inequality nexus 
for European Emerging Economies is an interesting case as this region has shown 
diverging developments as compared to advanced economies. On one hand, the 
levels of household debt in CESEE have remained below the levels experienced 
in other parts of the world (e.g., the US, OECD, Euro area countries). On the 
other hand, the increase in household indebtedness has been coupled with a rela-
tively high level of income inequality, with the Gini coefficient close to 0.5 in some 
countries.
Against that background, our paper is one of the first to explore the link 
between indebtedness and income inequality in CESEE. We use data from a house-
hold survey performed in ten CESEE countries in the period 2008- 2018.1 The data 
offer important advantages as compared to other data sets and the studies men-
tioned so far. First, they are comparable across a relatively large set of countries 
and thus alleviate concerns about biases coming from different sampling methods. 
Second, our data set encompasses 11 years in a repeated cross- section (and not a 
1The CESEE country aggregate in this paper includes EU member states (Bulgaria, Croatia, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) and (potential) EU candidate countries (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Serbia).
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panel)2 at the individual level including both the pre- crisis and post- crisis period 
making our results more robust to time variation concerns. Additionally, our focus 
on loan intentions allows us to disentangle demand and supply factors.
In our preferred specification, we apply an upward- looking measure of income 
inequality, the relative reference income, which gives the average income of richer 
households as compared to the household’s own income (in line with Drechsel- 
Grau et al., 2014). We apply multilevel methodology to account for the correlation 
of responses from individuals from the same region. Finally, we provide a concise 
test to assess which are the most suitable reference groups also including a spatial 
aspect.
To foreground our findings, a higher relative reference income3 is negatively 
correlated with households’ likelihood of having a loan for households at the bot-
tom of the income distribution. This is consistent with the signaling channel 
prompting banks to redirect their loans to richer households. For households at the 
top of the distribution, the relation between the relative reference income and debt 
is positive, consistent with both the signaling channel and the “Keeping up with the 
Novaks” channel. We show this impact for almost all components of household 
debt, but evidence is strongest for mortgage and foreign currency loans. The mar-
ginal effect of an increase in the relative reference income by one unit4 is about 2 
percentage points for the top of the decile. The sign and magnitude of this effect 
are robust to different definitions of comparison groups. The results for the bottom 
of the distribution are driven by low inequality regions, whereas the results for the 
top of the distribution are driven by high inequality regions, hinting at a threshold 
effect. These results are robust to various alternative income inequality measures 
such as the Gini coefficient, income percentile ratios, or income shares. In addition, 
the analysis explores loan intentions and thus tries to disentangle, to the extent 
possible, demand and supply factors for household indebtedness. We find support 
for a positive correlation between loan intentions and income inequality at the top 
of the income distribution, supporting evidence for the “Keeping up with the 
Novaks” effect.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we start with a brief  
discussion on the theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the influence of 
the income distribution on household debt. The description of the data and the 
methodological setup follow in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. In Section 5, we turn 
our attention to an analysis with respect to loan purpose and currency denomina-
tion. Section 6 zooms in on the impact on households’ loan intentions. Sections 7 
and 8 focus on alternative measures of income inequality and test the suitability 
of reference groups on the regional level, respectively. The last section concludes.
2The data could only be used as panel data if  data are aggregated at regional or country level. 
Because this would result in a significant loss of information, we chose to work with the microdata at 
individual level and pool the data.
3The relative reference income is defined as the average income of richer households relative to the 
household’s own income. A high relative reference income therefore indicates that the household’s ref-
erence group income is large relative to that household’s own income. Detailed information on this 
variable can be found in Section 3.
4The median of the relative reference income is 2.6 in our sample.
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2. tHeoretical and eMPirical background
This study builds on literature that has theoretically and empirically analyzed 
the economic consequences of income positional concerns. Looking at the demand- 
side aspect, the relative income theory of consumption (Veblen, 1899, Duesenberry, 
1949) states that an individual’s utility function depends on the consumption of 
other persons (their reference group).5 Furthermore, assuming that the individual’s 
utility depends on interpersonal comparisons, it follows that changes in the con-
sumption of an individual’s reference group influence that person’s own consump-
tion. Drechsel- Grau et al. (2014) conceptualize these interpersonal comparisons in 
the following Euler Equation6:
where cit is the consumption of individual i at point t, cref ,t is the consumption of 
the reference group,  and  are constants with information about the interest rate, 
the discount factor, and parameters of the utility function, and Xi a vector of other 
variables that influence marginal utility. Therefore, this argument stresses the social 
nature of consumption decisions. If  incomes at the top of the income distribution 
grow, given a positive , individuals at the bottom increase their consumption, and 
therefore dissave/borrow.
Closely related to the above is the habit formation theory, which describes a 
situation where in case of economic distress, an increase in borrowing would follow 
when individuals try to avoid cutting down on the level of consumption already 
attained (e.g., Iacoviello, 2008; Fasianos et al., 2017). As over- borrowing has been 
attributed to be one of the main causes of the financial crisis 2007– 2008, this effect 
has received particular attention in the US (Van Treeck, 2014; Mian and Sufi, 2015; 
Bertrand and Morse, 2016).
An extensive body of literature explores the hypothesis that individuals derive 
utility from status, which in turn depends on what others believe about people’s 
income (Ireland, 1994; Charles et al., 2009). While income is not observable, con-
sumption is very frequently visible. Therefore, the level of individuals’ conspicu-
ous consumption (i.e., consumption that displays social status) can be expected 
to depend on the income distribution of the entire sample of individuals under 
observation. For example, Danzer et al. (2014) show that internal migrants in 
Kazakhstan use status consumption to impress their new neighbors. Against this 
background, some consumption and loans can be driven by conspicuous motives. 
Therefore, the impact of the income distribution on the likelihood of having a loan 
and on the loan’s purpose (e.g., consumption, car, or mortgage) will enable us to 
make inferences about the existence and magnitude of such motives. The expendi-
ture cascade approach by Frank et al. (2014) argues in a similar vein.
5A notable study on the effect of income comparisons on life satisfaction, especially relating to our 
geographical context, is Senik (2004). Using household survey data from Russia, the paper shows that 
the income of the reference group favorably affects expectations about own future income, the so- called 
“tunnel effect” (Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973).
6See Drechsel- Grau et al. (2014) for the derivation of this result from a standard optimization 
problem.
(1) Δln(cit)=+Δln(cref ,t)+ΔXit+it,
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The theoretical predictions of these concepts have been widely empirically 
assessed. For instance, Kumhof et al. (2015) show that for the US a surge in the 
income share of the top deciles could largely explain the buildup of leverage 
among households at the bottom of the income distribution. Building on the cen-
tral assumption that income shocks are of permanent nature, the authors present 
a model that shows that higher leverage and financial crises are the endogenous 
result of a growing income share of high- income households. For Italy, Loschiavo 
(2016) shows that richer households living in regions with higher income inequality 
are more likely to be indebted than similarly rich households residing in regions 
with low- income inequality (and vice versa for poorer households). Carr and 
Jayadev (2015) is a study closely related to ours, as it relates relative income of 
households to debt using US household data. Analyzing the period 1999– 2009, 
they find a confirmation for the “Keeping up with the Joneses” effect as the growth 
of household debt increases with the share of families with higher income than the 
family in question. In addition, their findings show that low- income households 
are more likely to leverage up than higher income households during the increase 
in household leverage in the early 2000s in the US. For a sample of EU countries, 
Jestl (2019) shows that a positive effect prevails in the third quartile and thus upper 
middle class in most of the countries.
The relative income theory addresses the nexus between the consumption/
income distribution and spending from a demand- side angle. Considering in addi-
tion the supply- side perspective, banks might use income distribution information 
next to information on a household’s income to assess borrowers’ creditworthiness, 
especially in countries with low credit register coverage (as is the case in some of 
the CESEE countries in our sample). Coibion et al. (2014) refer to this as the “sig-
naling channel” and show that banks cannot observe borrowers’ ability to meet 
debt obligations to a sufficient extent, so they consider the observed respondents’ 
income together with income inequality in the region or the country. Accordingly, 
banks tend to restrict lending funds to poorer households when income inequality 
increases. This reasoning is used to rationalize the finding that in the period from 
2001 to 2012, low- income households in high- inequality regions in the US accu-
mulated less debt relative to income than their counterparts in regions with lower 
income inequality. In addition, higher income inequality might lead to higher debt 
as people on the higher end of the income distribution generally have a higher pro-
pensity to save (Kumhof et al., 2015).
The demand and supply channels are usually activated simultaneously 
(Bazillier and Hericourt, 2017), so the net effects are hard to disentangle. Therefore, 
one possible reason why some of the studies only find an effect at the top of the dis-
tribution could be the diametrical effect of the supply side- channel. In the empir-
ical part, we first report the net effect of the income distribution on debt which 
provides information on whether the demand or supply effect dominates. In a next 
step, we distinguish between existing loans and planned loans to be able to discern 
demand and supply in the analysis.
The empirical literature on the relative income hypothesis often imposes a 
certain reference group leaving out a discussion on the suitability of a criterion for 
choosing a suitable reference group. However, are households perceptive of the 
income of their direct neighbors, households in the same city, region, or country? 
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Notable exceptions include Clark and Senik (2010), who, using European survey 
data, find that income comparisons are directed at work colleagues. Senik (2009) 
finds that households surveyed in the former communist countries compare their 
living standard mainly with that of former schoolmates and colleagues.7
Often, choices defining the “Novaks” are practically bound by data con-
straints. This is also the case in our study, as data limitations prevent us from per-
forming an analysis at a level more disaggregated than the regional level. However, 
it is still possible to test differences in outcomes for more coarse neighborhood 
definitions. In particular, we investigate if  neighboring regions affect household 
debt. To do so, we separately estimate the effects of relative reference income on 
debt for the home region and neighboring regions. We also investigate if  defining 
the whole country as a reference group instead of the respective region changes the 
results.
The paper most intimately related to this study and covering the same set 
of CESEE countries is Hake and Poyntner (2019). This paper features an initial 
explorative analysis of the correlation between the probability of having a loan 
and income inequality for the period 2009– 2017. However, in contrast to the pres-
ent study, the authors neither explore in detail the impact on different types of 
loan, various income inequality measures, loan intentions nor look into the spatial 
aspect of the definition of the reference groups.
3. data and descriPtive statistics
3.1. Data
The empirical analysis is based on data from the OeNB Euro Survey— a 
household survey performed in ten CESEE countries and commissioned by the 
Austrian Central Bank (OeNB). The survey was performed twice a year between 
2007 and 2014 and has been performed annually since 2015. It includes six EU 
member countries (Bulgaria- BG, Croatia- HR, Czech Republic- CZ, Hungary- HU, 
Poland- PL, and Romania- RO) and four (potential) EU candidates (Albania- AL, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina- BA, Serbia- RS, and North Macedonia- MK). In each 
country and per wave, the target population comprises around 1000 interviewees 
representative of a country’s population, aged 14 years or older, selected via a 
multi- stage stratified random sampling procedure. The data are a repeated cross 
section at the individual/household level. For the period of analysis of this paper 
(2008– 20188), this corresponds to a total number of observations of about 134,000.9 
The survey delivers information at the regional level, whereas the allocation roughly 
corresponds to NUTS 2.10
7According to Knight et al. (2009), Chinese households report that their reference groups are indi-
viduals in the same village.
8Although the survey was initiated in 2007 for the first time, we left out the first year (i.e., 2007) as 
the question on household debt was only introduced in the 2008 survey.
9The number of observations corresponds to roughly 2000 per country and year in the period 
2008– 2014 and roughly 1000 observations per country and year in the period 2015– 2018. Data for the 
Czech Republic for 2008 and 2010 were incomplete and are therefore not included.
10For more information on the survey, see https://www.oenb.at/en/Monet ary- Polic y/Surve ys/
OeNB- Euro- Survey.html.
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The survey includes questions on the use of the euro in a household’s port-
folio but also covers information on both the assets and liabilities of households. 
In particular, it informs about loans a respondent might have, either alone or with 
their partner, the purpose of the loans, and their currency denomination. The data 
also include information on whether respondents plan to take out a loan in the 
near future and again about its purpose and currency denomination. Apart from 
assessing the income of respondents in those ten CESEE countries, the survey also 
collects information on sociodemographic characteristics, including age, educa-
tion, and employment status. Finally, the survey also includes various questions on 
sentiments about future developments and on past experiences.
3.2. The Relative Reference Income
Our income information is based on the OeNB Euro Survey question: “What 
is the total monthly income of the household after taxes?”.11 Between 2008 and 
2016, survey respondents were asked to place their income in one of 20 income 
categories.12 Before the survey data were passed on to external use, the ranges of 
categories were harmonized across the different countries and over the years by the 
survey team. In addition, they transformed amounts transformed into euro and 
into purchasing power units (to capture exchange rate and inflation differences) to 
ensure cross- country comparability.13 We then took the average of each income 
category to compute the equalized household income. Only starting in the 2017 
and 2018 survey waves, respondents were asked to report the exact amount of their 
household income.
This paper follows an approach first applied in Belabed and Hake (2018) to 
make adjustments to the income data coming from the survey. First, these adjust-
ments include treating item non- response to address missing income data from 
some respondents. On average, 20 percent of respondents did not respond to the 
income question (highest share of non- response in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, and Romania with up to 29 percent; the Czech Republic has the lowest 
share with 3 percent). As we cannot assume that income information is missing 
completely at random, we opted against dropping these observations to avoid the 
issue of selection bias (Groves and Peytcheva, 2008; ECB, 2016).14 Following 
Harrell (2001) and Gulyás (2009), we applied a hotdeck imputation method. 
Thereby, it is assumed that the item non- responses would be randomly distributed, 
11A cross- check with the median net income reported by EU- SILC respondents for eight countries 
shows a close correspondence.
12The income ranges have been set up such that they are representative of the country’s income 
distribution. For example, Serbian respondents were asked to place their income in one of the following 
brackets: 0– 5000 dinars, 5001– 10,000 dinars, etc.
13We want to stress that the data transformations described above have been performed on the 
survey raw data and by the survey team. The authors have been allowed to use the data only after these 
transformations have been done.
14We tested the hypothesis that the missing income data might be assigned to the more affluent part 
of the respondents. A probit estimation on the likelihood of not disclosing income information showed 
that it is rather young male respondents with university education without children who refuse to reply 
to this question. At the same time, students and unemployed in the data sample are also more likely to 
retain information on their income. Thus, these results are not clearly affirmative of the assumption that 
the more affluent part of the sample refuses to answer.
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that is, missing at random within a group. With respect to our income variable this 
means that the probability of refusal is related to some socioeconomic factors, but 
within each socioeconomic group, the probability of missing values is independent 
of income. In particular, the hotdeck imputation replaces missing values in the 
income data with complete lines, that is, observations that are similar from the 
same stratum, which in this case is the observations in the same region– year pair.
Second, we applied Pareto correction to handle possible misreporting of the 
upper tail of the income distribution in our data set (Atkinson, 2017). Thus, we 
estimate a Pareto- shaped distribution for the top quintile of the distribution which 
should yield more realistic values of income and its distribution (in line with, 
for instance, Piketty and Saez, 2003; Blanchet et al., 2017 or Eckerstorfer et al., 
2016). To perform a Pareto distribution for top incomes, we need two parameters: 
(i) the size parameter m and (ii) the shape parameter  (or Pareto’s alpha). The 
size parameter m determines the threshold of income above which the functional 
form of the distribution follows a power- law. The shape parameter  determines 
the shape or slope of the distribution function beyond the threshold and may be 
considered a measure of inequality itself— a lower  indicates a higher level of 
inequality and vice versa.
To determine the size parameter m, we follow Eckerstorfer et al. (2016), 
who model a Pareto- shaped distribution for the top quintile of the distribution. 
Thereby, we focus on the country- level income distribution. Certainly, the choice 
of m is crucial for the resulting estimates of income concentration as it determines 
the part of the distribution which follows a Pareto- type distribution. Choosing 
a size parameter below the (unobserved) true value includes observations from 
the non- Pareto part of the distribution, whereas the choice of a higher value may 
exclude observations from the Pareto part of the distribution. In contrast to other 
surveys, a key advantage of our data is that we are able to compute  coefficients 
for every country and year in our sample (for more details, see Belabed and Hake, 
2018).
After the above- mentioned income data adjustments were performed, in the 
following we will introduce our main income inequality variable. The main income 
inequality variable we apply in the present analysis is the relative reference income 
(hereinafter referred to as relinc). From a demand- side perspective, the literature 
emphasizes that interpersonal comparisons are upward- looking: households com-
pare their consumption to richer households and adjust their consumption prefer-
ences accordingly (Ferrer- i- Carbonell, 2005; Carr and Jayadev, 2015). We therefore 
follow Drechsel- Grau et al. (2014) and define the households’ reference income to 
account for upward- looking comparisons.15 The reference income of a household 
is the average income of all households in the income deciles above the respective 
household’s income, in the given year. The relative reference income relinc is defined 
as the ratio of the reference income to the household’s own income.
The relative reference income for a given household i in a given year is there-
fore defined as follows:
15In particular, Drechsel- Grau et al. (2014) focus on consumption and define reference consump-
tion as the consumption level of all households that are perceived to be richer than the respective 
household.
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where i = 1,…,N and j = 1,…,K  are households, Di is the regional income decile 
of household i, and Yi is the income of household i. As we have a repeated cross- 
section, each household appears once in the survey; therefore, the reference income 
is calculated for the year of the respective survey. Relinc is bounded by 1 from 
below per definition, whereas the highest value is 92 in the sample (see descrip-
tive statistics in the Appendix). A higher relinc therefore indicates higher income 
inequality in the sense that the income of a household’s reference group is large 
relative to the household’s own income.
We decided to define the reference groups as households in the same region. 
We acknowledge that the “Keeping up with the Novaks” hypothesis conveys the 
idea that individuals are influenced by people they frequently interact with, such as 
neighbors, family, or colleagues. However, the regional level is the most granular 
level of data that allows us to have a sufficient number of observations as the num-
ber of observations at the PSU (primary sampling unit) level is too small.16 We 
consider this income inequality measure to be most suitable for our analysis due to 
two reasons. First, it is an upward- looking measure per definition, which is suitable 
for our interpersonal comparison setting. Second, as per definition, this measure 
incorporates a household’s own income, allowing for a relative reference income 
measure for each household.17
Figure 1 shows the distribution of households’ relative reference income per 
country, while the income deciles and the respective comparisons are constructed 
on the regional level. Respondents in the lowest- income deciles (1st and 2nd) have 
the highest relinc of  up to 92 (in Serbia), implying that the income of a household 
in the first decile could be up to 92 times lower than the average income of all 
deciles above the 1st decile. For the whole sample, the median of the relative refer-
ence income for all deciles is 2.6, while 99 percent of all observations are below 14. 
Judging by the descriptive evidence, there is some country- level variation as well. 
Accordingly, the households at the lower end of the income distribution in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia tend to be relatively 
more disadvantaged (i.e., have a higher relinc) than households in the same deciles 
in other countries.
Important to note is that for some observations, it is possible that households 
in higher deciles have a lower relinc than households in a lower decile. This is due 
to the fact that we define the reference income as the mean income of households 
in higher deciles. Therefore, households with very similar incomes that are grouped 
into different deciles have different reference incomes. Take for instance an example 












16In Section 5.2, we show that defining the reference group as richer households in the same coun-
try (as opposed to region) does not alter the results.
17In Sections 5 and 8, we show the robustness of our results using modified versions of this mea-
sure as well as other inequality measures.
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income of 115 euros.18 which places it in income decile 2, whereas the mean income 
of households in deciles 3– 10 is 303 euros. Said household’s relinc is 2.6 (303/115). 
The next household with an income of 120 euros is placed in income decile 3. The 
mean income of households in deciles 4– 10 is 329 euros. This household’s relinc is 
2.7. Therefore, it is possible that households in higher deciles have a higher relinc. 
However, poorer households in the same decile of course always have a higher 
relinc. In Section 5.2, we show that our results are not sensitive to defining the ref-
erence income as the average income of all richer households, including those in 
the same decile.19
3.3. Evidence on Existing and Planned Household Loans
The OeNB Euro Survey provides information on whether households in the 
CESEE sample have or intend to take out a loan. Moreover, it also contains infor-
mation on the loan’s purpose (i.e., consumer loan, mortgage loan, car loan, or loan 
18As stated in the previous subsection, the data have been converted into euro and PPP.
19See Appendix Figure A1 for an example of the relationship between the components of the rela-
tive reference income variable and income deciles.
Figure 1. Relative Reference Income relinc by Decile and Country
Note: The relative reference income relinc is the mean income of households in higher deciles 
divided by the households’ own income. Income deciles are formed at regional level.
Source: OeNB Euro Survey, own calculations.
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for other purposes) and its currency denomination.20 Therefore, our analysis 
focuses on the likelihood of having/planning to take out a loan and not on the 
respective amount of the loan.
Figure 2 shows the development of the share of households with loans over 
time. It also shows the minimum and maximum shares per region in the respective 
country. Accordingly, the variance of the regional share of respondents with loans 
is on average the highest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, and the Czech 
Republic. Overall, the average shares of indebted households are the highest in 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Croatia pertaining to about one- third of the total 
respondents. Figure 3 shows the share of households planning to take out a loan. 
On average, 8.4 percent of all respondents plan a loan. The share is the highest in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Serbia (see also Table A3 in the Appendix).
3.4. Income Distribution and Household Debt: A First Glance at Correlations
Figure 4 plots the region/year means of relinc and the mean share of house-
holds with a loan (in contrast to Figure 1, we show the decile/year means for this 
20The loan question is asked in the following way: “Do you, either personally or together with your 
partner, currently have any loans that you are still paying off?” and “Do you plan to take out a loan within 
the next year and if so, in what currency?”, respectively. If  respondents have or plan to take out a loan, 
they are asked to specify the purpose of the loan: “to finance a house or apartment,” “for consumption 
goods (furniture, travelling, household appliances, etc.),” “to finance a car,” or “for other purposes.”
Figure 2. Current Loans
Note: The black bars denote the mean share of households with a loan of regions in a country, the 
upper arrow shows the maximum share, and the v the minimum share.
Source: OeNB Euro Survey, own calculations.
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measure). We observe a slight negative correlation between the relative reference 
income and loan shares, as depicted by the fitted values indicated by the red line. 
In Figures 5– 7, we plot loan shares and three income inequality measures as com-
puted using the income data from the OeNB Euro Survey: the Gini coefficient, 
the share of the top 10 percent, and the top 1 percent households in the regional 
income distribution, respectively. Again, the slightly negative correlation remains 
irrespective of the income inequality measure used.
4. MetHodology
Our chosen methodology accounts for the fact that both regional and indi-
vidual factors might correlate with a household’s likelihood to have or to intend 
to take out a loan. In particular, we first follow the assumption that the “Keeping 
up with the Novaks” effect is most likely located at the regional level as house-
holds that are spatially close to each other tend to have the most frequent inter-
actions. Accordingly, the correlation between income inequality and household 
debt is likely to differ between households in different regions and countries, as 
households’ characteristics interact with institutional characteristics. Therefore, 
the assumption that observations are conditionally independent given the covari-
ates is likely to be violated because of interdependence of households in a region. 
Figure 3. Planned Loans
Note: The black bars denote the mean share of households planning to take out a loan of regions 
in a country, the upper arrow shows the maximum share, and the v the minimum share.
Source: OeNB Euro Survey, own calculations.
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Disregarding this interdependence can lead to spurious “significant” coefficients 
of the included variables. Against that background and to account for the nested 
structure of the data (i.e., “clusters”), we apply multilevel models (Rabe- Hesketh 
and Skrondal, 2012), widely used, for instance, in health (e.g., patients nested in 
hospitals) and social sciences (e.g., students nested in schools). As our outcome 
of interest for this paper is a binary variable (a dummy variable indicating that a 
household has or plans to take out a loan), we apply a multilevel probit model. It 
contains random effects to account for the interdependence of observations at the 
cluster levels (regions).
We consider the following two- level models:
(3) Pr(loanirt=1|Xirt,Ur)=H(Xirt+ZirUr),
(4) Pr(planloanirt=1|Xirt,Ur)=H(Xirt+ZirUr),
Figure 4. Correlation Between relinc  and 
Current Loan Share
Figure 5. Correlation Between Gini 
Coefficient and Current Loan Share 
Figure 6. Correlation Between Top 10 
Percent Share and Current Loan Share
Figure 7. Correlation Between Top 1 Percent 
Share and Current Loan Share
Note: The dots are region- year means for the share of households with loans and relinc, the Gini 
coefficient, the regional share of the top 10 percent households, and the regional share of the top 1 
percent households.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
14
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
with r = 1, . . . 76 clusters, in our case regions, consisting of i = 1,…,N house-
holds, observed in t = 1,…,T  years. Xirt is a 1 × p vector of covariates. In the base-
line regression the following variables are included: income, sex, age, age squared, 
children, education, dummies for unemployed, self- employed, student, and 
retired.21  is a vector of regression coefficients. The 1 × p vector Zir denotes the 
random effects in both intercepts and coefficients. Ur denotes the random effects. 
H(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The same approach 
has been applied for the different types of loans as well.
The choice of the level of the analysis (region, country) is key for the model 
as it determines the level of the random effects. The dependent variable has to 
show some unexplained variance related to the cluster. Therefore, if  there was no 
variance left after including all the variables on the individual/household level, the 
inclusion of the regional level would be superfluous.
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) gives an indication for the correct 
choice of level. In the two- level specification (individual and region effects), the 
overall error term wr is decomposed into eir and uir, where er is the random error 
term for the i − th respondent within the r − th region and is assumed to have zero 
mean and constant variance 2
e
. The regional effects are estimated through ur which 
is assumed random with zero mean and a constant variance 2
u
. The partitioning 
of the variance in this manner defines a measure to test the suitability of the mul-
tilevel modeling, ICC. It measures the strength of “nesting” within the data hierar-
chy and is given as follows:
Therefore, the ICC is the proportion of variance in the dependent variable 
accounted for by the group level.
Table 1 suggests that introducing both regions and countries as levels into our 
multilevel model improves our estimations.22 However, a small number of clusters 
at the second level (in our case, countries) can lead to a severe bias. While the liter-
ature cannot offer a clear- cut indication on how many level- two clusters are suffi-
cient (e.g., Maas and Hox, 2005, Schunck, 2016), 10 countries is very low by any 
measure and the probability of downward bias would be present if  we included 









22For the sake of comparison, Table A5 in the Appendix shows the results of a non- multilevel 




# of  Levels Level ICC Std. Err. 95% Conf. Int.
1 country 0.035 0.015 0.015 0.082
1 region 0.038 0.006 0.028 0.052
2 country 0.031 0.015 0.013 0.076
2 region 0.047 0.014 0.026 0.083
Note: ICCs calculated after estimation of multilevel probit models without covariates, dependent 
variable: current loan.
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both regions and countries as levels. Against the background of cluster numbers 
and lower ICCs at country level, we opted for including only the regional level in 
the main estimations.23 In addition, the country variation has been captured by 
country dummies, thus allowing for different intercepts but not allowing for differ-
ent coefficient estimates at country level.
In the following sections, the coefficients reported should be understood as 
correlations and not as causal effects despite some attempts to alleviate endogene-
ity issues throughout the paper.
5. HouseHold debt at equilibriuM
5.1. Baseline Estimations
This section focuses on current household loans and the correlation with 
income inequality. We explore various features of existing loans such as the pur-
pose of the loans (Subsection 5.3) and currency denomination (Subsection 5.4). In 
addition, robustness of the results along different reference groups is investigated.
Table 2 presents the results of the baseline estimations for current household 
loans. This realized debt is the “equilibrium” outcome, as opposed to the demand 
for loans we explore in Section 6. We control for major sociodemographic variables 
such as age, education, and employment status in all estimations.24 In column (1), 
we include the constant only to show the explanatory power of the regional- level 
variables. Accordingly, nearly 4 percent of the variation could be explained by the 
regional- level variables. When including the income inequality variable as a level 
effect (i.e., without differentiating between the income deciles), a higher relative 
income correlates negatively with the likelihood to have a loan (column (2)). It is to 
be noted that a higher relative income indicates that the household has a lower 
income compared to its richer reference group. A higher relative income therefore 
indicates higher (upward- looking) income inequality.
Columns (3)– (7) show the results for the different income deciles. There is a 
positive correlation between the relative reference income above the fifth income 
decile of the regional distribution and the likelihood to currently have a loan. This 
finding is consistent with the demand- side “Keeping up with the Novaks” effect as 
higher reference income increases the demand for debt. At the same time, it is also 
consistent with the signaling channel, the supply- side channel (see Coibion et al., 
2014), where increasing income inequality increases credit supply for the top of the 
distribution. For households at the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution, 
a higher reference income is correlated with a lower probability of having a loan. 
Therefore, for the bottom of the distribution, the supply- side channel that reduces 
loan supply for poorer households seems to dominate the demand channel.
Splitting the regions along the level of the average relative reference income 
of 2.6 does not change the results qualitatively. The results in columns (4) and (5) 
show, however, that the negative effects at the lower end of the regional income 
23However, in Table A4 in the Appendix, we show that including countries as levels does not alter 
our main findings for the baseline estimates for existing loans.
24The characteristics refer to the survey respondent.
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distribution are driven by low income inequality regions. The positive correlation 
for the top of the distribution is mainly driven by high- inequality regions. This is a 
policy- relevant result which shows that financial inclusion (the number of people 
reached by financial services) might be deterred by higher income inequality.
In a next step, we add proxies for wealth (i.e., whether households hold sav-
ings, cars, or property), in column (7). The latter components were only included 
from 2011 on; therefore column (5) repeats the baseline estimation in column (3) 
but for the period 2011– 2018. The results suggest that our findings are not driven 
by confounding wealth effects affecting debt intake. However, the coefficients for 
the wealth controls should be taken with a grain of salt due to endogeneity issues. 
The included sociodemographics largely show the expected signs. Older respon-
dents are more likely to have a loan, but this effect is nonlinear starting to decline 
above the age of 53, and this is also in line with the negative sign of the “retired” 
dummy. Respondents with a university degree are also more likely to have a loan. 
As for female respondents and respondents with children, it is to be noted that 
these coefficients are to be understood as correlations for households with a female 
partner and a household with children, thus probably not directly comparable with 
other studies due to this specific feature of the loan- questions. Accordingly, house-
holds with a female partner and households with children are more likely to take 
out a loan.
As the coefficients so far show the qualitative stance, we compute the average 
marginal effects to get a better idea of the economic size of the effect (Figure 8). 
For instance, the average marginal effect of respondents’ relative reference income 
in the seventh income decile is 0.02, which means that an increase in the relative 
reference income in this decile by 1 unit (for instance, from 2 to 3) would increase 
the likelihood of a household in this decile to have a loan by 2 percentage points. 
Considering that the share of indebted households in the upper deciles is higher 
than in the rest of the income distribution, the overall effect of the relative refer-
ence income on household indebtedness is non- negligible.
5.2. Household Indebtedness in CESEE: Different Reference Groups
In this section, our aim is to explore if  the correlation found so far is driven by 
our definition of a reference group. In particular, we try to answer the question: Is 
the upward- looking component primarily driven by households that have the same 
age, education, or only by those close to the households’ own income rank?
The estimation results are presented in Table 3. First, for the sake of easier 
comparison, in column (1) we include the baseline estimation from Table 2, where 
the reference group are all households in higher regional income deciles.
In column (2), the reference group is defined as only those households that are 
in the next higher decile at regional level. The reason is that households might focus 
above all on households that are richer but still close to their own income rank 
(Drechsel- Grau et al., 2014). Interestingly, our expectations for larger coefficients 
in this case are confirmed (for the marginal effects see Figure 9). This could indicate 
that households compare the most with their immediate “income neighbors.”25
25It is, however, also possible that this result is driven by the fact that when only using the neighbor-
ing decile, relinc is per definition smaller than it is when using all richer deciles.
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In columns (3) and (4) we define the reference groups to be at the same educa-
tional level26 and in the same age group27 at the regional level, respectively. The 
results from the baseline estimations remain unchanged. A caveat in this analysis is 
the at times relatively low number of observations that are used to calculate the 
reference income for each education/age group- year cell. While empty cells do not 
occur frequently, the reference income is calculated as the average income of a low 
number of observations. Therefore, while it is reassuring that the signs of our coef-
ficients are mostly unchanged, effects sizes should be interpreted with a grain of 
salt.
Finally, the reference group in column (5) includes all households which are 
more affluent (including the ones in the household’s own regional income decile). 
An advantage of this approach is that we also obtain an estimate of the top income 
decile— where no significant effect can be found. Our main takeaway from the esti-
mations so far is that there is a robust pattern not entirely driven by specific sub-
groups (see Figure 10 and 11).
26Education has been defined in categories low, medium, and high.
2714– 24 years; 25– 54 years; 55 years and older.
Figure 8. Marginal Effects of Relative Reference Income at Income Deciles for the Estimations in 
Table 2, Columns 3, 4, 5, and 7
Note: Average marginal effects of relative reference income for selected specifications of 
estimations presented in Table 2. The grey area depicts the 95 percent confidence interval.
Source: OeNB Euro Survey, own calculations.
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5.3. Exploring Heterogeneity: Household Loans by Purpose
In a next step, we investigate if  the nexus between the reference income and 
existing household debt differs depending on the purpose of the “equilibrium” 
loans. We use information gathered by the OeNB Euro Survey from 2010 to 2014, 
where respondents were asked about the loan purpose according to four categories: 
mortgage, car, consumption, and other- purpose loans.
Traditionally, households in the CESEE countries show a high preference 
for owning their residences (Del Pero et al., 2016). Apart from a high preference 
for buying a home, favorable credit supply conditions and increased availabil-
ity of  housing have led to a higher demand in mortgage- financed housing (see 
Rosan and Zauder, 2019). Accordingly, column (1) of  Table 4 shows a high pos-
itive correlation between reference income and mortgage loans. Interestingly, 
the coefficients’ signs are positive even in the third and fourth decile. This might 
suggest a stronger demand- driven link. For consumption and other- purpose 
loans, we see a pattern similar to our baseline specification. For loans financing 
cars, only the second decile shows a significant (negative) coefficient. Overall, 
the results in columns (1), (3), and (4) support the “Keeping up with the Novaks” 
hypothesis.
Figure 9. Marginal Effects— Various Reference Groups as Included in the Estimations in Table 3
Note: Average marginal effects of relative reference income for selected specifications of 
estimations presented in Table 3. The grey area depicts the 95 percent confidence interval.
Source: OeNB Euro Survey, own calculations.
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5.4. The Currency Composition of Household Loans
A potential concern for any causal interpretation of  our results is omitted 
variable bias. In particular, if  a factor influences both the income distribution 
and the probability of  having a loan at the same time, this could lead to a bias 
in the estimated coefficients. Some endogeneity concerns could be alleviated if  
we take a look at the currency denomination of  the loans, as described in detail 
below.
In the Euro Survey, respondents are asked to state the currency denomination 
of their loans and place their replies into one of the following five categories: (1) 
the whole amount is in foreign currency, (2) the whole amount is in local currency, 
(3) the loan is predominantly denominated in foreign or (4) in local currency, and 
(5) the loan is equally split. Based on the information whether a household has a 
loan that corresponds to one of these five categories, we perform several estima-
tions. The estimation results are presented in Table 5.
Our baseline results show that the strongest link between reference income 
and household indebtedness can be found for loans that are fully denominated in 
foreign currency (this applies to nearly 20 percent of households with a loan) or 
Figure 10. Marginal Effects of Relative Reference Income on Loans by Purpose at Income Deciles for 
the Estimations in Table 4
Note: Average marginal effects of relative reference income for loan purposes as presented in 
Table 4. The grey area depicts the 95 percent confidence interval.
Source: OeNB Euro Survey, own calculations.
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for loans fully denominated in local currency (about 58 percent households with a 
loan). There is also some correlation for predominantly local currency loans. For 
the remaining categories (mostly foreign or equally split), no significant correla-
tion can be found (however, the sample size of these categories is also significantly 
lower).
These results alleviate some omitted variable bias/endogeneity concerns, given 
that shocks that affect income inequality and loans at the same time are more likely 
to affect loans in local currencies but not loans denominated in foreign currency. 
An example of this are the favorable economic conditions leading to a higher 
level of local currency credit supply and higher reference income at the same time. 
As the survey data also show, most of the households with loans fully denomi-
nated in foreign currency have those loans in a foreign- owned bank (56 percent). 
Accordingly, if  a shock causes the bias, the effect on foreign currency loans should 
be smaller or nil, which is, overall, not the case as our results show. The only nota-
ble differences can be observed in the lower part of the distribution. This might be 
related to a potentially stronger signaling effect for domestically owned banks, as 
domestically owned banks potentially acquire more information about the local 
income distribution.
Figure 11. Marginal Effects at Income Deciles for the Estimations in Table 5
Note: Average marginal effects of relative reference income for loans by currency composition 
presented in Table 5. The grey area depicts the 95 percent confidence interval.
Source: OeNB Euro Survey, own calculations.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
25
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
6. ZooMing- in on tHe deMand of HouseHold loans in cesee
Looking at the literature, it becomes apparent that disentangling the effects of 
demand and supply factors on loans is a daunting task. As shown in Section 5, 
existing loans in our survey data constitute equilibrium transactions without any 
information on whether the result was supply- and/or demand- driven. In this sec-
tion, we attempt to take a closer look at the demand side of the correlation between 
household loans and income inequality using a different question from our data set 
concerning the intentions of respondents to take up a loan. In particular, we ground 
our analysis in this section on a question where respondents have to indicate whether 
they plan to approach a bank to demand a loan in the following 12 months.28 In a 
subsequent step, information is provided on the purpose of the intended loan (i.e., 
house, car, consumption, or other purposes).29 For this part of the analysis, we use 
data from 2011 to 2018 due to data availability considerations.
The results are presented in Table 6. Overall, we find some indication for 
a positive correlation between a larger relative reference income and loan plans 
above the seventh decile, although this correlation tends to be weaker than in the 
case of current “equilibrium” loans. Interestingly, when testing whether this result 
is valid for all planned loan categories, it remains valid only for loans for car pur-
chases. This could indicate conspicuous motives for loan demand as cars have been 
shown to be a highly visible (consumption) good (e.g., Heffetz, 2011). However, 
loans aimed at acquiring consumption goods do not seem to support the conspic-
uous motive. Overall, our data do not allow much interpretation in this direction. 
The results in columns (7) and (8) hint at threshold effects because the strongest 
correlation can be found for high inequality regions.
Loan intentions could also be influenced by households’ sentiments about 
past developments with respect to the country or related to past experiences of the 
respondents themselves. Against that background, in Table 7 we include informa-
tion from the OeNB Euro Survey on (1) developments of the financial situation of 
the household in the past 12 months, and (2) the current economic situation of the 
country.30 Our results show that a good financial situation of the household and a 
good economic situation of the country increase the likelihood to plan to take out 
a loan. Similar to Table 3, we could not detect any significant effect for household 
savings. Including those variables does not alter our main results. Going forward, 
we investigated whether over the long period of time we cover in our paper there 
were any changes with respect to the correlation between the likelihood to plan a 
loan and income inequality. Therefore, we split the period before and after 2012 
that marks the Euro area sovereign debt crisis that also impacted the CESEE coun-
tries. The results show that the correlation seems to have strengthened slightly post 
2012 and only for the more affluent deciles pointing toward a higher risk aversion 
28The question in the questionnaire is: “Do you plan to take out a loan within the next year and if  
so, in what currency?”
29“What is the purpose of your loan or your loans? To finance a house or apartment, for consump-
tion goods (furniture, travelling, household appliances, etc.), for a car or for other purposes.” This 
question has been included in the questionnaire since 2011.
30The questions in the survey are worded as follows: “Over the last 12 months, the financial situation 
of my household has got better” and “Currently, the economic situation of my country is very good.” The 
replies of the respondents range between “strongly agree” and “strongly disagree” in five categories.
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on the part of the banks but also to a lower demand. Finally, we tested whether not 
having already a loan would increase the likelihood of planning one and if  so, for 
which households. The estimations in column (5) support our baseline results for 
the respondent without loans and in that case even less affluent households (i.e., in 
the fourth decile) increase the likelihood to plan to take out a loan.
7. alternative Measures of incoMe inequality
In a next step of our analysis, we also test the robustness of our estimations to 
alternative income inequality measures. For instance, we apply the Gini coefficient 
(ranging between 0 and 1) that is widely used in the literature instead of the rela-
tive reference income. The Gini coefficient incorporates movements in the whole 
income distribution, meaning that it is “noisier” than the stricter upward- looking 
comparison measure which we use in our baseline analysis. Therefore, we expect 
the effect of the Gini coefficient on household indebtedness to be smaller than 
the effect of the relative reference income. For instance, if  a household is in the 
TABLE 4  
HouseHold loans in cesee by PurPose
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House Car Consumption Other
Income distribution
1st decile#relinc 0.008 0.000 −0.012* −0.011**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
2nd decile#relinc 0.032** −0.042** −0.036*** −0.029
(0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.021)
3rd decile#relinc 0.033** −0.021 −0.013 −0.004
(0.014) (0.020) (0.015) (0.026)
4th decile#relinc 0.057*** −0.013 0.013 0.006
(0.020) (0.024) (0.019) (0.030)
5th decile#relinc 0.053** −0.030 0.014 0.012
(0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.027)
6th decile#relinc 0.106*** 0.006 0.019 0.032
(0.022) (0.023) (0.020) (0.028)
7th decile#relinc 0.095*** −0.001 0.052** 0.023
(0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.028)
8th decile#relinc 0.114*** 0.013 0.063*** 0.064**
(0.023) (0.029) (0.020) (0.032)
9th decile#relinc 0.107*** 0.005 0.079*** 0.070**
(0.024) (0.027) (0.021) (0.030)
Income 0.000*** 0.000** −0.000*** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cons −3.694*** −3.723*** −3.748*** −3.416***
(0.222) (0.167) (0.147) (0.195)
ICC (regional) 0.014 0.011 0.022 0.017
N 56,841 56,841 56,841 56,841
Dependent variable: binary response indicating if  respondents have a loan, by loan purpose. 
Estimation method: multilevel modeling. Sample where loan purpose question was included: 2010– 
2014. Country and time fixed effects included in all estimations. Intraclass correlation coefficient 
denotes the explained portion of the variance by inclusion of the regional (second) level covariates. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficient estimates for sociodemographics variables excluded 
in the table. Variables are defined in appendix.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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middle of the distribution, Gini changes attributed to income losses at the bottom 
of the distribution might not affect the household’s behavior because the house-
hold is comparing itself  in an upward- looking rather than downward- looking way. 
Indeed, as column (1) of Table 8 shows, the overall pattern is similar to our baseline 
inequality measure, but the correlation shown by the coefficient is weaker.
Another alternative income inequality measure that we use is the ratio between 
income in the 90th and 10th percentile. As depicted in column 2, this estimation 
yields results that are qualitatively similar to the results using the relative reference 
income. In addition, we also use the ratio between the 75th and the 25th percentile 
(column 3), and the results show that the bottom and top deciles have (weakly) 
significant coefficients as compared to the baseline estimations.
Going forward, columns (4)– (7) show the results for the share of the top 1 per-
cent, top 5 percent, and top 10 percent on total income, respectively, yielding very 
similar results to the baseline estimation with relative reference income. For the shares 
of the bottom 10 percent and bottom 20 percent, correlations are only present at the 
very bottom of the distribution. The last column finally calculates the difference 
between the log income of percentiles 90 and 10, as used by Coibion et al. (2014).
Overall, all the estimations above suggest that: (i) Our main result, that is, 
that higher income inequality is correlated with a lower probability of having a 
loan for the bottom third of the distribution and a higher probability of having a 
loan for the top of the distribution, is confirmed by various inequality measures 
other than the relative reference income used above. (ii) The strongest link between 
income inequality and debt can be captured by the P90/P10 percentile ratio and the 
share of the top 1 percent on total income. Generally, movements at the top of the 
income distribution seem to play a key role for both the signaling channel and the 
“Novaks” (i.e., demand) channel, while movements at the bottom of the regional 
income distribution tend to be less central.
8. WHere are “tHe novaks”? keePing uP WitH otHer regions
Until now, we have constructed the relative reference income using the income 
of more affluent households in the same region. In this section, we will focus on 
relaxing the assumption that respondents compare themselves only with “Novaks” 
from the same region. For that purpose, we also include households in neighboring 
regions and test whether this adds to the explanatory value. The reason for that is 
a high probability that households compare themselves not only to their “neigh-
bors” (households in the same region) but also to other households in their rela-
tive vicinity because of various possible social ties. In addition, from a supply- side 
perspective, banks that operate trans- regionally could have clients in other regions 
and thus include information from all regions of operation in their considerations.
Against that background, we use an explanatory spatial analysis to test if  
including the relative reference income for neighboring regions affects our results.31 
31Various other “neighbor” concepts are possible, for example, households closer than 100 km, 200 
km, etc. The analysis performed here is only exploratory, and a full spatial analysis is beyond the scope 
of this paper.
Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
28
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
29
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
30
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
31
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
32
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
33
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Review of Income and Wealth, Series 0, Number 0, Month 2021
34
© 2021 The Authors. Review of Income and Wealth published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf  of 
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
To disentangle “home region” and “neighbor region” effects, we construct the 
neighbors’ reference income separately. Relinc neighbor denotes the relative refer-
ence income of households in higher income deciles in neighboring regions of the 
same country. Table 9 depicts the baseline regression in column (1), while column 
TABLE 9  
sPatial diMension: neigHboring regions
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Relinc Neighbor Relinc Country
Income Distribution
1st decile#relinc −0.016*** −0.013 −0.015***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004)
2nd decile#relinc −0.026*** −0.041* −0.022***
(0.008) (0.022) (0.008)
3rd decile#relinc −0.013 −0.011 −0.009
(0.010) (0.025) (0.011)
4th decile#relinc 0.011 −0.006 0.015
(0.011) (0.032) (0.012)
5th decile#relinc 0.021 0.015 0.021
(0.013) (0.036) (0.014)
6th decile#relinc 0.050*** 0.080* 0.039***
(0.014) (0.041) (0.013)
7th decile#relinc 0.056*** 0.070** 0.055***
(0.014) (0.031) (0.014)
8th decile#relinc 0.068*** 0.078*** 0.068***
(0.015) (0.026) (0.016)
9th decile#relinc 0.069*** 0.048* 0.078***
(0.016) (0.029) (0.018)
1st decile#relinc neighbor −0.003
(0.009)
2nd decile#relinc neighbor 0.015
(0.021)
3rd decile#relinc neighbor −0.002
(0.024)
4th decile#relinc neighbor 0.017
(0.030)
5th decile#relinc neighbor 0.006
(0.034)
6th decile#relinc neighbor 0.005
(0.029)
7th decile#relinc neighbor −0.014
(0.028)
8th decile#relinc neighbor −0.010
(0.025)
9th decile#relinc neighbor 0.019
(0.020)
Cons −3.575*** −3.575*** −3.577 ***
(0.092) (0.093) (0.091)
ICC (regional) 0.015 0.015 0.014
N 116,666 116,666 116,462
Dependent variable: binary response indicating if  respondents have a loan. Estimation method: 
multilevel modeling. relinc neighbor denotes the relative reference income of households in higher in-
come deciles in neighboring regions of the same country. Country and time fixed effects included in all 
estimations. Intraclass correlation coefficient denotes the explained portion of the variance by inclusion 
of the regional (second) level covariates. Coefficient estimates for sociodemographics variables omitted 
in the table. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables are defined in the Appendix.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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(2) contains the added neighbor region income effect. This result suggests that the 
bulk of effects is for households in the same region, not neighboring regions. 
However, as some of the results for the influence of “home region”- relative income 
appear to lose their significance, possible co- movements between relative reference 
income at home and in neighboring regions could be at work.
Finally, we test a different definition for the reference group, namely that the 
reference group is defined as households in higher income deciles in the same coun-
try (as opposed to the same region). The results presented in column (3) show 
that our main results are robust, with negative effects of higher relative reference 
income at the bottom of the distribution and positive effects on loans at the top. 
This result suggests that the “Novaks” seem to be present at both country and 
regional levels, with little changes in quantitative terms of our estimates.
9. conclusions
In this paper, we analyze the nexus between household debt and income 
inequality in CESEE, using data from a household survey for the period 2008– 
2018. We compute and apply various income inequality measures on the regional 
level— a primer for many countries and years. Our empirical analysis aims at pin-
pointing the association between income inequality and the probability of cur-
rently being indebted or planning to take out a loan. As households are nested into 
regions, we use multilevel models that account for intra- regional correlation.
Our main findings are twofold. First, there is a negative correlation between 
the relative mean income of richer households and the probability of being 
indebted for the very bottom of the distribution. This result suggests a strong sig-
naling effect of income inequality, meaning that presumably, banks react to rising 
income inequality by targeting richer households with more, and cheaper, credit 
while restraining credit supply to poorer households. Second, there is a positive 
correlation between relative reference income and the probability of having a loan 
for the upper half  of the regional income distribution. This result is consistent 
with the aforementioned supply- side channel, but also with a demand- side channel 
(“Keeping up with the Novaks”). This result is robust against variations in the defi-
nitions of relative reference income and holds also when using traditional inequal-
ity measures such as the Gini coefficient, 90/10 percentile ratios, and the shares of 
the top 1 percent and top 5 percent of the income earners.
We also take a very disaggregated view of the nexus between the demand for 
loans and income inequality by looking at loans with different purposes. Although 
the coefficients in this case are quantitatively weaker, we can confirm a positive 
correlation at the very top of the distribution, supporting the “Keeping up with 
the Novaks” effect.
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APPENDIX
Figure A1: An Example for the Relationship Between Income, Reference 
Income and Relative Reference Income Note: This figure shows the relationship 
between income (triangles, left axis), mean reference income (rectangles, left axis) 
and relative reference income (dots, right axis) for the North Albania region 2015. 
The relative reference income relinc is the mean income of households in higher 
deciles divided by the households’ own income. The vertical lines depict the cut-
off  points of regional income deciles, denoted d1- d9. Source: OeNB Euro Survey, 
Own Calculations.
Table A1: Variables description
Table A2: Summary Statistics of Main Variables
Table A3: Descriptive Statistics (Average Over 2009 to 2018, Weighted)
Table A4: Household Loans in CESEE— Country and Region Levels
Table A5: Household Loans in CESEE— Probit Estimation
